We study sealed-bid second-price auctions with costly participation and resale. Each bidder chooses to participate in the auction if her valuation is higher than her optimally chosen participation cuto¤. If resale is not allowed and the bidder valuations are drawn from a strictly convex distribution function, the symmetric equilibrium (where all bidders use the same cuto¤) is less e¢ cient than a class of two-cuto¤ asymmetric equilibria. Existence of these equilibria without resale is su¢ cient for existence of similarly constructed two-cuto¤ equilibria with resale. Moreover, the equilibria with resale are "more asymmetric"and (under a su¢ cient condition) more e¢ cient than the corresponding equilibria without resale.
Introduction
We study resale in an independent private values auction setting with costly participation, with a particular focus on e¢ ciency. The seller uses a sealedbid second-price auction. Bidders are ex-ante symmetric: Their (use) values are drawn from the same distribution function. After learning their private valuations, bidders simultaneously decide whether to participate in the auction or not. Bidders who choose to participate incur a common real resource cost. 1 ' 2 In the absence of resale opportunities, there is a (unique) symmetric equilibrium of the second-price auction where each bidder bids her valuation i¤ it is larger than a participation cuto¤ that is common to all bidders. However, there may also be asymmetric equilibria with bidder-speci…c cuto¤s. 3 We …rst show that, when the valuations are distributed according to a strictly convex cumulative distribution function, there are asymmetric equilibria which are exante more e¢ cient than the symmetric equilibrium. Existence of asymmetric equilibria under strict convexity has been established by Tan and Yilankaya (2006) : For any arbitrary partition of the bidders into two groups, there exists an equilibrium where the bidders within a group all use the same participation cuto¤ that is di¤erent from the other group's cuto¤. We complement this …nding by showing that these two-cuto¤ equilibria provide a higher expected social surplus than the symmetric equilibrium (Proposition 1). The relevance of this result extends beyond second-price auctions, since Stegeman (1996) shows that one of the equilibria of the second-price auction maximizes social surplus within the class of all incentive-compatible allocation rules satisfying the "no passive reassignment"property. 4 The second-price auction allocates the object to the highest valuation bidder among participants in all equilibria where participating bidders bid their values. Yet, when the equilibrium is asymmetric, there is a possibility that a non-participating bidder has a higher valuation than the winner of the auction. This allocative ine¢ ciency implies that there are potential gains from further trade through resale. Hence we incorporate the possibility of resale (assumed to be costless) via an optimal auction maximizing the reseller's revenue, and study its impact on equilibrium behavior and e¢ ciency.
Suppose that there exists a two-cuto¤ asymmetric equilibrium of the secondprice auction without resale, where one group has a low cuto¤ and the other group has a higher one. We show that there also exists an equilibrium that partitions bidders the same way when resale is allowed. This resale equilibrium is "more asymmetric" than the corresponding no-resale equilibrium: The low cuto¤ decreases and the high cuto¤ increases (Proposition 2). The prospect of reselling the good induces the low-cuto¤ bidders to enter even more aggressively and the possibility of buying the object in the resale phase makes the high-cuto¤ bidders even more hesitant to enter. Moreover, there is overbidding by low-cuto¤ bidder types who hope to resell: They bid their adjusted values (payo¤s inclusive of the resale phase), which are higher than their use values.
Fixing participation and bidding behavior in the initial auction, resale enhances e¢ ciency as the object is potentially transferred to a higher-value bidder. However, the possibility of resale may also a¤ect the equilibrium cuto¤s and bids. Nevertheless, provided that a su¢ cient condition is satis…ed, allowing resale improves ex-ante e¢ ciency: Whenever there is a two-cuto¤ asymmetric equilibrium without resale, the corresponding more asymmetric equilibrium with resale yields a higher social surplus (Proposition 3). The e¢ ciency gains from resale are not solely the result of savings in participation costs. First, our su¢ cient condition is on the distribution of valuations and hence independent of the magnitude of the participation cost. Second, allowing resale may actually increase participation, and hence total participation cost incurred. Similarly, this e¢ ciency result is not an artifact of the modeling choice that there are no participation costs in the resale stage: We provide examples with costly bidding in resale where asymmetric equilibria exist and yield higher surplus than the corresponding no-resale equilibria. We discuss this issue further in our concluding remarks.
Resale is commonly observed after auctions in many markets. There are a few sources of gains from resale trade o¤ered in the literature. New bidders or more information to existing bidders may arrive between the initial auction and the resale stage (Bikhchandani and Huang, 1989; Haile, 1996 and 2003; Bose and Deltas, 2006) . Bidder asymmetries may also cause ine¢ ciencies in …rst-price auctions (Gupta and Lebrun, 1999; Hafalir and Krishna, 2008; Cheng and Tan, 2010; Lebrun, 2010a; Virág, 2013) . 5 In second-price and English auctions, even when resale is allowed, (use) value-bidding remains to be an equilibrium (see, for example, Haile, 1996) . This equilibrium allocates the object to the highest value bidder and hence there is no resale on the path of play. However, bidding one's value is no longer weakly dominant when resale is allowed. Garratt and Tröger (2006) identify alternative equilibria where even a speculator with no use value can make positive pro…ts. Garratt, Tröger, and Zheng (2009) construct equilibria for the English auction with a designated bidder (potential reseller) which can then be used to support collusion (by rotating the designated bidder). In these equilibria, bidders other than the designated one drop out of the auction immediately, if their values are below a common cuto¤. 6 Our equilibrium construction for second-price auctions with costly participation follows a similar participation cuto¤ structure. However, unlike in Garratt, Tröger, and Zheng (2009), our asymmetric equilibria allow for designating multiple bidders who use a lower participation cuto¤ than the others and hence who all have the potential to resell the good. Regardless of whether they are low or highcuto¤ bidders, all participants bid their adjusted values that re ‡ect potential gains from resale. As we discussed above, when there are participation costs, second-price auctions (without resale) may have asymmetric equilibria in undominated strategies, where all participants bid their values. We investigate the resale opportunities naturally arising from these equilibria.
When resale takes place under asymmetric information, any equilibrium with a positive probability of resale would allocate the good in an ex-post ine¢ cient manner: The bidder who ends up with the good at the end of the resale stage is not necessarily the bidder who values it the most. This is the reason that the equilibria identi…ed by Garratt, Tröger, and Zheng (2009) induce a lower social surplus than the use-value bidding equilibrium. Such an allocative ine¢ ciency is also present for the asymmetric equilibria of the second-price auction. Despite this allocative ine¢ ciency, our paper introduces a welfare-enhancing role for resale when participation is costly.
The closest paper to ours is by Xu, Levin, and Ye (2013), who study second-price auctions with resale, where valuations and participation costs are both private information. They show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique under some conditions. Participants in the initial auction bid their adjusted values and there is resale in equilibrium. Resale opportunities arise because of di¤erences in participation costs: When a low-cost bidder wins the object, she can resell it to a high-cost bidder with a higher valuation (who did not participate in the initial auction). Further analytical results are di¢ cult to obtain with two-dimensional private information. Their numerical analysis suggests that the e¤ect of resale on e¢ ciency (and on revenue) is ambiguous. In our model with commonly known participation costs, we show that heterogeneity of costs is not necessary for equilibrium resale. Instead, resale opportunities are generated by asymmetric equilibria. This setting also allows us to obtain an analytical result on the impact of resale on e¢ ciency.
In the next section, we describe the environment and study the benchmark case, where resale is not allowed. We study resale in Section 3, analyzing the optimal resale auction, and the participation and bidding behavior in the initial auction. We provide some concluding remarks in Section 4. All proofs are in the Appendix.
No Resale
We consider a symmetric independent private values environment. There is a risk-neutral seller who owns an indivisible object and is selling it via a sealedbid second-price auction without a reserve price. Her valuation is normalized to be 0. There are n 2 risk-neutral (potential) bidders. Let v i denote the (use) value of bidder i 2 f1; :::; ng for the object. Bidders' valuations are independently distributed according to the cumulative distribution function (cdf) F on [0; 1], with continuously di¤erentiable and positive density function f . Bidders know their own valuations. We assume that the monotone hazard rate condition is satis…ed:
is strictly decreasing in v. Note that this condition automatically holds for convex distribution functions (for weakly increasing density functions f ).
There is a participation cost, common to all bidders, denoted by c 2 (0; 1): Bidders must incur this real resource cost in order to be able to submit a bid. 7 All bidders make their participation and bidding decisions simultaneously. They know their valuations when making these decisions.
Equilibrium
We …rst study the benchmark case where there is no resale possibility. If a bidder decides to participate in the second-price auction, she cannot do better than bidding her own valuation. Accordingly, we only consider (BayesianNash) equilibria in cuto¤ strategies: Each bidder bids her valuation if it is greater than a cuto¤ point and does not participate otherwise. 8 Even though all participating bidders bid in the same truthful manner, there may be asymmetric equilibria where bidders have di¤erent participation cuto¤s. In what follows, we restrict attention to equilibria with (at most) two cuto¤s. Since our results are of the existence/possibility variety, this restriction has no bearing on them, while simplifying the exposition considerably. 9 Suppose that l bidders use the low cuto¤ a and h = n l bidders use the high cuto¤ b in some equilibrium, with 0 a b 1 and 1 l n. These cuto¤s are determined by indi¤erence (to participation) conditions. To …nd them, …rst consider the participation decision of one of the l bidders who has the lower cuto¤ a and whose valuation is also a. Suppose that all other bidders are following their equilibrium strategies. She obtains the object i¤ she is the only bidder to participate, which happens with probability F (a) l 1 F (b) h , and hence pays 0 if she wins. Her expected payo¤ from participation is then
Similarly, the expected payo¤ of a high-cuto¤ bidder with valuation b is
De…ne the following functions: 
H (a ; b ) c, with equality if b < 1.
Any bidder with a value lower than c will have a negative payo¤ from participation. So, we know that a c > 0, and the …rst condition will be satis…ed with equality. 10 We note the following observation, which will be used later:
Notice that, since we allow for the possibility that a = b, the symmetric equilibrium is a special case within the class of (at most) two cuto¤ equilibria. There always exists a symmetric equilibrium where all bidders use the same participation cuto¤ a = b = v s 2 (c; 1), where
Tan and Yilankaya (2006) show that strict convexity of F is su¢ cient for existence of two-cuto¤ asymmetric equilibria for any l, the number of bidders using the lower cuto¤. It may be helpful to go over their argument with graphs, which we will also utilize for our results. Consider the set = f(a; b) : 0 a b 1g in R 2 that identi…es feasible participation cuto¤ pairs, and the curves given by~ L (a; b) = c and~ H (a; b) = c in . When F is strictly convex, the second curve is steeper than the …rst one at (v s ; v s ), the symmetric equilibrium cuto¤s. If these curves intersect in the interior of , their intersection yields the cuto¤s for an asymmetric equilibrium, satisfying (3) with equalities ( Figure 1 ). Otherwise, we have a corner asymmetric equilibrium with a 2 [c; v s ) and b = 1, where~ L (a ; 1) = c and~ H (a ; 1) c, as depicted in Figure 2. 
E¢ ciency
We can write down the social surplus as a function of the two cuto¤ points in the no-resale setting:
(5) The …rst integral measures the expected value of the object for the winner of the auction when she is a low cuto¤ bidder with a value on interval [a; b], and the second one is the expected value for a winner with a valuation higher than b. The last two terms are expected participation costs incurred by all bidders. Note that the seller's valuation is normalized to be 0 and the payment made by the winning bidder is just a transfer to the seller.
The derivatives of this social surplus function with respect to its two arguments can be written by referring to functions~ L and~ H that we just de…ned:
Therefore, the social surplus is decreasing in a and increasing in b for the set of points where~ H (a; b) c ~ L (a; b), i.e., the lens-shaped areas in Figures  1 and 2 . Accordingly, when F is convex, social surplus will be higher on the asymmetric equilibria identi…ed by Tan and Yilankaya (2006) in comparison to the symmetric equilibrium.
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Proposition 1 If F is strictly convex, then, for any l 2 f1; 2; :::; n 1g, there exists an asymmetric no-resale equilibrium, where l bidders use cuto¤ a and h = n l bidders use cuto¤ b > a , that generates a higher social surplus than the symmetric equilibrium.
This result holds regardless of the magnitude of the participation cost c, the number of bidders n, and the way bidders are classi…ed into low and highcuto¤ groups. For given levels of c and n, strict convexity of F in Proposition 1 can be replaced with the weaker local condition that
is strictly increasing at the symmetric cuto¤ v s , de…ned in (4). This local condition is all that is needed to generate the lens-shaped areas such as those in Figures 1 and 2 . 11 In both of the examples in Figures 1 and 2 , the asymmetric equilibrium payo¤ of the low-cuto¤ bidder is (weakly) higher than her symmetric equilibrium payo¤ (regardless of her valuation). The payo¤ ranking of the equilibria is reversed for the high-cuto¤ bidder. These equilibrium properties are most evident in the second example, since the high-cuto¤ bidder never participates under the asymmetric equilibrium and the low-cuto¤ bidder acquires the good by incurring the participation cost only. But for both examples, the sum of the ex-ante expected payo¤s of the two bidders is larger under the asymmetric equilibrium. Moreover, if the role of the low-cuto¤ bidder is assigned to the two bidders with equal probabilities, then both bidders are weakly better o¤ at the interim stage under the asymmetric equilibrium, regardless of their valuations. This equal assignment procedure can be supported if the bidders have access to a public randomization device, as in Garratt, Tröger, and Zheng (2009), or if they are facing each other repeatedly in a series of independent auctions, as in Bikhchandani and Riley (1991) .
Strict convexity implies that
is strictly increasing for all v. 12 Finally, note that the result identi…es at least n 1 distinct (ignoring permutations of bidder identities) asymmetric equilibria of the second-price auction, and each of them has a higher surplus than the symmetric equilibrium. 13 
Resale
Asymmetric equilibria of the second-price auction with participation costs, such as those we discussed above, have the following feature: Even though the object is obtained by the bidder who has the highest valuation among participants, a nonparticipant may have a higher valuation. Therefore, when the winner of the auction has a valuation which is lower than the participation cuto¤ of another bidder, there are potential gains from further trade. To investigate this issue, we now allow for a resale stage where the winner of the initial auction can design her own resale auction for potential bidders.
Timing is as follows: Bidders make participation and bidding decisions simultaneously in the initial auction. The winner designs a resale auction if she chooses to do so. Others make their simultaneous participation and bidding decisions in this resale auction.
We assume that the highest bidder learns that she is the winner and does not learn others'bids. 14 We also assume that there are no participation costs in the resale stage, and discuss this assumption in our concluding remarks.
as the virtual value of a bidder with value v. In Celik and Yilankaya (2009), we showed that, if
is strictly increasing, then the optimal auction is asymmetric, implying (using the connection we mentioned) that the e¢ cient auction is asymmetric when
is strictly increasing. 13 The equilibria identi…ed in this proposition are the only asymmetric equilibria when F ( ) is log-concave (see Footnote 9) . Using the results in Celik and Yilankaya (2009) and the parallels between the e¢ cient and the optimal auctions, we can show that the social surplus is maximized with an asymmetric equilibrium where l = 1 and h = n 1 under log-concavity. 14 We make this no-disclosure assumption only for notational simplicity. Full disclosure of all bids (or any other intermediate disclosure policy) would not a¤ect our equilibrium outcome since our equilibrium construction is based on adjusted value-bidding: The participants in the initial auction will bid their adjusted values inclusive of the expected resale payo¤ and no bidder in the initial auction will participate as a buyer in the resale phase. See Lebrun (2010b) for a discussion of importance of bid disclosure policies, especially in …rst-price auctions with resale.
We look for (Perfect Bayesian) equilibria of this game where bidders are divided into two groups that use two (potentially distinct) participation cuto¤s in the initial auction, just like before. Similarly, we restrict attention to equilibria in which participants in the initial auction bid their adjusted values (gross expected payo¤ inclusive of the resale stage). 15 We analyze the optimal resale auction …rst (given the restrictions above), followed by bids and equilibrium participation cuto¤s in the initial auction.
Optimal resale auction
Suppose that l bidders use cuto¤ a and h = n l bidders use cuto¤ b in the initial auction, with 0 a b 1 and 1 l n. Suppose further that bids are monotone increasing in valuations and that bidders with identical valuations bid the same amount (if they participate). In these equilibria we are constructing, there are opportunities for resale only if a bidder wins the initial auction with a value between a and b. The bidders who are using the higher cuto¤ b in the initial auction are the potential buyers in the resale stage. The winner of the initial auction (one of the l bidders who use a as the cuto¤ and who has a valuation in [a; b]) has learned that none of these high-cuto¤ bidders have a value higher than b, otherwise they would have participated in the initial auction and acquired the good. Therefore, the problem she is facing is …nding the optimal auction for h 1 bidders whose valuations are independently distributed on [0; b] according to the cdf
. 16 ' 17 If the reseller's valuation were commonly known, this would be the standard optimal auction problem à la Myerson (1981) . However, it is not known, and so we have an "informed principal" problem. 18 Fortunately, it is possible to show that this does not matter in this independent private values setting. It is optimal for each type of the reseller in [a; b] to choose a standard optimal auction for that type. 19 There are many auctions which are expected-payo¤ equivalent for the reseller and the bidders (the revenue equivalence theorem), but we will focus on a second-price auction with an optimal reserve price r(w) for the reseller with valuation w 2 [a; b], satisfying 20 '
The monotone hazard rate condition implies that, for any b, the right hand side of (7) is decreasing in r for r 2 [0; b]. Thus there is a unique value for r (w) 2 (w; b]. Note that we have r 0 (w) 2 (0; 1) and r (b) = b. A bidder with value v participates in the resale auction if v r, and bids v. It is straightforward to calculate the expected payment she makes to the reseller if she wins the resale auction: 18 Garratt, Tröger, and Zheng (2009) avoid this problem by restricting attention to resale mechanisms that the reseller cannot participate by sending a message at the same time as (or after) the other bidders. They allow for bidder valuations to be drawn from di¤erent distributions. They highlight certain properties of Myerson's optimal auction when it is used as a resale mechanism for these bidders. Our optimal resale auction is much simpler since the values of the potential bidders are identically distributed at the resale stage.
19 Yilankaya (1999) shows this in the bargaining context, i.e., when h = 1. The same argument applies for h > 1 (Yilankaya, 2004 , available from the authors upon request): The Myerson auction is optimal when the seller's valuation is common knowledge. It is also the seller's ex-ante optimal mechanism. Myerson's principle of inscrutability (1983) implies that it will be the informed principal's optimal mechanism. Also see the discussions in Maskin and Tirole (1990), Garratt, Tröger, and Zheng (2009), and Mylovanov and Tröger (2014) . 20 On the equilibrium path, it does not matter which of the optimal auctions is used in the resale stage. However, the choice of the resale auction matters when considering potential deviations in the initial auction. 21 We suppress the dependence of r on b for notational simplicity. 22 This expression may be familiar as the equilibrium bid function in a …rst-price auction with h bidders whose valuations are distributed according to
Revenue equivalence theorem implies that this is the expected payment of the winner in the second-price auction.
Equilibrium bids in the initial auction
Now that we discussed the optimal resale auction on the equilibrium path, we are ready to study bidding in the initial auction. As we mentioned above, we look for an equilibrium in which bids are given by gross expected payo¤s, taking the resale stage into account. When the winner is a bidder with a valuation higher than the high cuto¤ b, there is no room for resale and the winner's payo¤ is equal to her (use) value. On the other hand, when the winner is a low-cuto¤ bidder with a valuation v 2 [a; b], her gross payo¤ is equal to the expected continuation payo¤ in the resale stage. In the Appendix (Lemma 1), we show that this continuation payo¤ is b
h dx, where r (x) is the optimal reserve price for a bidder with valuation x, by using the revenue equivalence theorem. 23 The next step is establishing the existence of an equilibrium where each participant in the initial auction bids her adjusted value. This result is not trivial, since each bidder's resale stage payo¤ also depends on her own bid in the initial auction. We show in the Appendix (Lemma 2) that, conditional on participating according to their respective cuto¤s, the optimal bid for a low-cuto¤ bidder is
and the optimal bid for a high-cuto¤ bidder iŝ
where "N o"denotes not participating.
High-cuto¤ bidders bid their use values if they participate, since their participation precludes a resale stage. The equilibrium bid of a low-cuto¤ bidder is higher than her use value when it is in [a; b). Bidders with such valuations are aware of the possibility that they can resell the good to a high-cuto¤ bidder who has a higher use value. Since this possibility is decreasing in the valuation of the low-cuto¤ bidder, the extent of overbidding is decreasing in v (and it is eliminated for v b).
Bidding functions ( ) and^ ( ) imply that the initial auction is ex-post e¢ cient in a constrained sense: It allocates the good to the bidder with the highest valuation among participants. Any ine¢ ciency in the initial auction (therefore, any resale opportunity) is due to possible asymmetric participation behavior, which we discuss next.
Equilibrium participation in the initial auction
A bidder's participation decision in the initial auction will depend on the comparison of the participation cost with the payo¤ di¤erential generated by her participation, taking into account the resale stage. In the Appendix (Lemma 3), we show that, for each bidder, this payo¤ di¤erential is (weakly) increasing in her valuation when other bidders are using cuto¤ strategies. Therefore, it is su¢ cient to consider participation incentives for bidders whose valuations are equal to their respective cuto¤s.
Consider one of the l low-cuto¤ bidders who has a valuation equal to her cuto¤ a. This bidder cannot buy the object in a resale auction since all the equilibrium reserve prices will be higher than a. When she enters in the initial auction, she would be the winner if she is the only participant. Given the other bidders' participation decisions, the probability of this happening is F (a) l 1 F (b) h . This sole participant does not make any payment, and her expected payo¤ in the continuation game is (a). Therefore, her payo¤ differential for participation in the initial auction is
Now consider one of the h high-cuto¤ bidders who has a valuation equal to her cuto¤ b. If she participates (and bids b), then her expected payo¤ will be
To see this, notice that she wins only if none of the h 1 high-cuto¤ bidders participates and all the l low-cuto¤ bidders have valuations less than b. She pays 0 if none of the low-cuto¤ bidders participates (when all of them have valuations less than a). Otherwise she pays the bid of the highest-valuation low-cuto¤ bidder, (w).
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On the other hand, if she stays out, then her expected payo¤ will be
since resale auction occurs if none of the h 1 other high-cuto¤ bidders participates in the initial auction and the highest valuation among low-cuto¤ bidders is in [a; b]. The bidder who has this highest valuation w sets the reserve price r(w), so the expected payment of type-b bidder is (b; r (w)) (see (8)). Therefore, the payo¤ di¤erential for a high-cuto¤ bidder with valuation b is
We prove the following in the Appendix.
Remark 2 L (a; b) is increasing in a and b for a > 0, and H (a; b) is increasing in a.
We are …nally ready to identify the conditions that equilibrium cuto¤s a and b must satisfy, analogous to conditions (3) in the no-resale setting:
These conditions admit a symmetric solution, with a = b = v s , the symmetric equilibrium cuto¤ of the benchmark no-resale case. There is no resale in this equilibrium, since the bidder with the highest valuation receives the object.
Our next result is about the existence and properties of equilibria with asymmetric cuto¤s, where resale is an equilibrium phenomenon. Whenever there is an asymmetric equilibrium (with two cuto¤s) in the benchmark noresale case, there will also be an asymmetric equilibrium with resale. Moreover, the equilibrium with resale will be "more asymmetric." Proposition 2 Suppose that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in the benchmark case of no-resale with l 2 f1; 2; :::; n 1g bidders using the cuto¤ a and h = n l bidders using the cuto¤ b > a . Then there exists an asymmetric equilibrium with resale, where l bidders use cuto¤ a and h bidders use cuto¤ b > a . Moreover, a < a and b b (with strict inequality if b < 1). A key step in our proof is showing that L (a; b) >~ L (a; b) and H (a; b) < H (a; b) for b > a > 0. These inequalities imply that the asymmetric noresale equilibrium cuto¤s (a ; b ) lie below the curve given by H (a; b) = c and above the curve L (a; b) = c. The remainder of the argument is very similar to our discussion of asymmetric equilibria in the no-resale benchmark. If these two curves intersect in the interior of = f(a; b) : 0 a b 1g, their intersection yields the cuto¤s for an asymmetric equilibrium with resale, satisfying (15) with equalities. Otherwise, we have a corner equilibrium either with a = 0 (Figure 3 ) or with b = 1 (Figure 4) . The resulting equilibrium cuto¤s (a ; b ) are more asymmetric than the corresponding no-resale equilibrium cuto¤s (a ; b ) in the sense that they are further away from the symmetric equilibrium cuto¤ v s .
In an equilibrium such as the one described above, a low-cuto¤ bidder participates and bids more aggressively in the initial auction due to the opportunity to resell to a high-cuto¤ bidder. This opportunity in turn is supported by some types of the high-cuto¤ bidder remaining out of the initial auction to buy later in the resale stage. This asymmetry in behavior arises as an equilibrium phenomenon even though bidders are ex-ante symmetric, as it is the case in the no-resale benchmark. A similar speculative motive also appears in the symmetric equilibrium of Xu, Levin and Ye's (2013) model with two possible (privately-known) participation costs: Bidders with high cost tend to stay out of the initial auction and the low-cost bidders over-enter and over-bid with the hope of reselling the object. With Proposition 2 we show that this speculative motive and resale can arise in equilibrium even when all bidders have the same participation cost.
E¢ ciency with resale
To examine the welfare e¤ects of resale, we consider the social surplus as a function of two participation cuto¤s. This surplus function is constructed under the assumption that, once the bidders enter in or stay out of the initial auction according to these participation cuto¤s, they follow the equilibrium bidding and resale strategies described above.
The …rst integral term refers to the expected surplus if the initial auction allocates the good to a low-cuto¤ bidder with valuation in [a; b]. This expected surplus is calculated by taking the possibility of resale into account. The second integral term is the expected surplus when the highest valuation among all bidders is higher than cuto¤ b. The last two terms measure the expected cost of participation. For …xed cuto¤s, the possibility of resale increases total welfare: S (a; b) > S (a; b) for a < b, since
This di¤erence is simply the surplus gain of transferring the object from a low-cuto¤ bidder with value w to a high-cuto¤ bidder with a higher value v in the resale phase.
Consider an equilibrium in the benchmark case of no-resale with asymmetric cuto¤s a and b . As we just observed, if bidders were to use the same cuto¤s when resale is allowed, then the surplus would be higher, i.e., S (a ; b ) >S (a ; b ). However, the possibility of resale may also change equilibrium participation behavior of the bidders. Therefore, we need to know how the value of function S (a; b) changes as we move from the no-resale equilibrium cuto¤s (a ; b ) to resale equilibrium cuto¤s (a ; b ). With our next result, we provide a su¢ cient condition for the social surplus to increase when resale is allowed.
Proposition 3
Suppose that there exists a two-cuto¤ asymmetric equilibrium in the benchmark case of no-resale and that
is weakly increasing. Then there exists an asymmetric equilibrium with resale which generates a higher social surplus than does this asymmetric no-resale equilibrium.
To prove the proposition, we …rst show that the social surplus function S (a; b) is decreasing in a and increasing in b whenever
is weakly increasing. The result then follows from inequalities a < a and b b . Proposition 3 provides a su¢ cient condition on the distribution of valuations only. Hence, it is independent of the magnitude of the participation cost c, the number of bidders n, and how these bidders are divided into two groups. The condition is satis…ed when the cdf for the valuations is a power function, i.e., F (v) = v for > 0 (since
= ). 25 
Concluding Remarks
We study resale and show that it can be an equilibrium phenomenon in a symmetric second-price auction with costly participation. The equilibrium with resale is more asymmetric than the corresponding one without resale due to speculative motives. When resale is not allowed, we identify asymmetric equilibria that are more e¢ cient than the symmetric one if the cdf of bidders' valuations is strictly convex. We provide a su¢ cient condition for resale to improve (ex-ante) e¢ ciency. Therefore, when F is strictly convex and this su¢ cient condition is satis…ed, we have a ranking: Symmetric equilibrium (resale allowed or not) is less e¢ cient than the asymmetric no-resale equilibria we identi…ed, which in turn are less e¢ cient than the corresponding asymmetric resale equilibria.
There is ambiguity for the e¤ect of resale on the expected number of participants, and hence on the expected participation cost incurred. This can be seen by considering the examples depicted in Figures 3 and 4 , where n = 2 and F (v) = v 2 . When c = 0:01, no-resale asymmetric equilibrium cuto¤s are (a ; b ) = (0:11; 0:301), while with resale equilibrium cuto¤s are (a ; b ) = (0; 0:454), with a decrease in participation. However, resale increases participation when c = 0:4, because the equilibrium cuto¤s change from (0:4; 1) to (0:044; 1): The high-cuto¤ bidder does not participate in either case while the low-cuto¤ bidder is more likely to participate when there is resale. This example also demonstrates that the e¢ ciency gains from resale are not only due to savings in participation costs.
We assume that there are no participation costs at the resale stage. One possible justi…cation is that the reseller may follow a bidder quali…cation procedure which is less stringent than that of the original seller, e.g., due to the original seller being a public entity (see Xu, Levin, and Ye, 2013, who also assume costless resale). However, the main reason for our assumption is to keep the analysis simple. When there are participation costs and more than one potential bidders for the resale (i.e., h > 1), the optimal resale auction would be more complicated than a standard auction; in particular, it could be asymmetric (Celik and Yilankaya, 2009 ). Nevertheless, we would like to stress that the welfare improvement under resale is not an artifact of the costless resale assumption. To illustrate this point, we reconsider the examples in that bidding in the resale auction is as costly as bidding in the initial auction.
The new participation cuto¤s are di¤erent than they were in the costless resale case: The asymmetric costly-resale equilibrium cuto¤s are (0; 0:433) for participation cost c = 0:01, and they are (0:376; 1) for participation cost c = 0:4. For either cost level, the social surplus of the asymmetric costly-resale equilibrium (net of the participation costs in the initial auction and in the resale stage) is larger than the corresponding no-resale equilibrium social surplus. 26 The e¤ect of resale on expected revenue is also unclear. Opportunity to resell the object induces higher participation and higher bids by some of the bidders, leading to a positive impact on revenue. Other bidders, however, would participate less since they might have the option to buy the object later, identifying a countervailing factor. Therefore, the net e¤ect of resale on revenue is ambiguous, as can be seen in the following classes of examples: In the asymmetric no-resale equilibrium we construct, if some bidders never participate in the auction regardless of their values and at least two other bidders participate with positive probability (i.e., if b = 1 and l > 1), revenue would be higher in the corresponding equilibrium with resale (since the participating bidders will enter with higher probability and bid more). On the other hand, allowing for resale would eliminate all revenue if the asymmetric equilibrium with resale has only one bidder participating with a positive probability (i.e., if b = 1 and l = 1).
Finally, in our model, bidders make their participation and bidding decisions simultaneously. Another possibility is bidders making their participation decisions …rst and then bidding after having observed the number of participants (e.g., Xu, Levin, and Ye, 2013). This alternative scenario (or even observing the identities of participants) would not change our results, since in equilibrium all bidder types bid their adjusted values inclusive of the payo¤ from resale stage.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 1 (no-resale)
Following the proof of Proposition 3i in Tan and Yilankaya (2006) 
This function is also continuously di¤erentiable with g (v s ) = 0. According to the no-resale equilibrium conditions (3)
0, with equality if b < 1. This con…rms the existence of the symmetric equilibrium at a = b = v s . Tan and Yilankaya (2006) show that when F is strictly convex, function g ( ) is strictly decreasing around v s . This implies that the equilibrium conditions are satis…ed for at least one pair of asymmetric cuto¤s: Either there exists a b 2 (v s ; 1) such that g(b ) = 0 (thus there exists an asymmetric equilibrium with b as the high cuto¤ and (b ) as the low cuto¤), or g (1) 0 (thus there exists an asymmetric equilibrium with 1 as the high cuto¤ and (1) as the low cuto¤). Now consider the smallest value of b that satis…es these equilibrium conditions: b = min fb > v s : g (b) 0, with equality if b < 1g. b is well-de…ned since g ( ) is continuous and it is strictly decreasing for values close enough to v s . To see that surplus is higher under cuto¤s b and
By de…nition of b, the integrand is positive for all b 2 v s ; b , proving that S b ; b > S (v s ; v s ).
Lemma 1 Consider a low-cuto¤ bidder with value w 2 [a; b] who won the initial auction. Her expected payo¤ from the resale phase is
Proof Consider the standard optimal auction problem where the seller's value is w 2 [a; b], there are h 1 bidders whose valuations are independently distributed on [0; b] according to cdf
, where 0 a b 1. Note that (18) is just the expected payo¤ of the seller, obtained from the standard formulation (see Myerson (1981) ) by using a change of variables to incorporate the reserve price. Here we give a heuristic argument as well: The revenue equivalence theorem implies that the continuation payo¤ for the winner of the initial auction is a continuous function of her valuation and its derivative at each valuation is equal to the probability that the bidder will keep the good at the end of the resale phase. Bidders with v b will not resell the object if they win the initial auction. Accordingly, the continuation payo¤ of a bidder with valuation b is equal to b. A reseller with value w 2 [a; b], who sets her reserve price optimally to r(w), does not sell the object if all h bidders have valuations less than r(w), which happens with probability
Lemma 2 Consider bidder i who has a higher value than her participation cuto¤. Suppose that all bidders except this bidder are following the entry and bidding strategies in (9) and (10) . Conditional on participation in the initial auction, it is optimal for bidder i to bid according to (9) and (10).
Proof
Step 1: Bidding higher than the adjusted values in (9) or (10) is not a pro…table deviation.
Suppose that bidder i bids higher than her adjusted value given in (9) or (10). Overbidding will a¤ect this bidder's payo¤ only in the case that she makes the highest bid and there exists other bidder(s) whose bids are higher than the adjusted value of i. Let j be the highest-value bidder among them and let w be the value of bidder j. Bidder i acquires the good in the initial auction and pays the (adjusted) value of bidder j. Consider the resale stage. Bidder i only knows that she is the winner of the initial auction. In order to construct an upper bound on the resale payo¤ of bidder i, suppose that bidder i also learns the identity and the bid (thus, the valuation) of bidder j after the initial auction and is allowed to use this information when designing the resale auction. If w b then bidder i's optimal resale mechanism is selling the good to bidder j at price w, which brings the same resale revenue to bidder i as she paid in the initial auction. If w < b then both bidder i and bidder j must be low-cuto¤ bidders. In this case, bidder i's optimal resale mechanism consists of two steps. First, she will try to resell the good to bidders other than bidder j using an optimal auction with reserve price r (w). If she cannot sell the good in the …rst step then she can sell it to bidder j at price w. This procedure yields an expected payo¤ exactly equal to (w), which is the adjusted value of bidder j and the price that bidder i paid in the initial auction. This rules out any positive pro…t from overbidding.
Step 2: For a low-cuto¤ bidder with valuation v 2 [a; b], bidding lower than the adjusted value in (9) is not a pro…table deviation.
Suppose that bidder i with valuation v 2 [a; b] bids lower than her adjusted
Underbidding is payo¤ relevant for this bidder when all high-cuto¤ bidders have values below b and the highest bidder's bid is lower than the adjusted value of i. Let j be the highest bidder and let w be the value of bidder j. By bidding according to (9) , bidder i could have bought the good in the initial auction at price (w) and her expected continuation pro…t would have been (v)
h dx > 0. By underbidding in the initial auction, bidder i can only acquire the good at the resale stage if v > r (w) and all the high-cuto¤ bidders have values below v. Conditional probability of the latter event is F (v)
h =F (b) h . Using the envelope theorem, the expected resale-stage payo¤ for the low-cuto¤ bidder with value v > r (w) will be R v r(w)
showing that underbidding is not a pro…table deviation for bidder i.
Step 3: For any bidder with valuation v > b, bidding less than v is not a pro…table deviation.
Suppose that bidder i with valuation v > b bids lower than v. Underbidding is payo¤-relevant for this bidder only if v is the highest realized value and the highest bidder's bid is higher than i's bid. Let j be the highest bidder and let w be the value of bidder j. If w is higher than b, underbidding is not a pro…table deviation: By bidding less than w, bidder i loses the good and receives zero payo¤, whereas by bidding her value she gets the object and obtains the strictly positive payo¤ v w. If w is lower than b, this implies that the highest bid belongs to a low-cuto¤ bidder. In this case, underbidding does not e¤ect the probability of receiving the good: if bidder i follows the equilibrium bidding strategy, she receives the good in the initial auction; if she underbids, she receives it in the resale stage. The price to pay in the initial auction is
h dx. The price to pay in the resale depends on the reserve price r (w) and the bids of the other bidders participating in resale. Notice that all these other resale-stage bidders are high-cuto¤ bidders and they have valuations in [a; b]. Depending on whether bidder i is a low or high-cuto¤ bidder, there may be h or h 1 other potential resale stage bidders. Therefore, the lower bound on the expected resale price is
It remains to show that this last expression is higher than (w), that is,
Multiplying both sides with F (b) h and rearranging gives
We can establish that
where the third equality follows from (7) . Therefore,
This last …gure is non-negative since r (x) x for all x 2 [a; b] and F (r (x))
is non-decreasing in x.
Lemma 3 Suppose that all bidders except one are following their equilibrium strategies. For the remaining bidder, the payo¤ di¤erential between participation in the initial auction and staying out of it is weakly increasing in her valuation.
Proof It follows from the revenue equivalence theorem that a bidder's "non-participation" payo¤ is continuous in her valuation and its derivative is equal to the probability that this bidder will acquire the auctioned object during the resale phase. Her "participation payo¤"is continuous in her valuation as well and its derivative is equal to the probability that she receives the good and keeps it after the end of the initial auction and the resale phase. To conclude that the payo¤ di¤erential is weakly increasing in valuation, it will be su¢ cient to show that probability of acquiring the good is at least as large for all bidder valuations if the bidder were to participate in the initial auction.
Suppose that the bidder's valuation is v. If this bidder stays out of the initial auction, she will acquire the object only when the valuations of all the high-cuto¤ bidders (excluding the bidder in question, in case that she is a high-cuto¤ bidder) are lower than v and the valuation of the highest low-cuto¤ bidder (excluding the bidder in question) is between a and r 1 (v). Now notice that, when the valuations of the other bidders satisfy this condition, the same bidder would have acquired the object by participating in the initial auction (either by overbidding the highest low-cuto¤ bidder or at the resale phase) as well. 27 This proves that entering in the initial auction does not decrease the probability of acquiring the object for any valuation.
Proof of Remark 2
i) L (a; b) is increasing in a and b for a > 0. Using (9) and (11), we have
where the second equality follows from f (r (x)) @r(x) @b = f (b) r 0 (x) (using the implicit function theorem for (7)), and the inequality follows from F (b) F (r (x)) and r 0 (x) 2 (0; 1). ii) H (a; b) is increasing in a: From (14) ,
Using (8), (9), and a change of variables (x ! r(x)),
where the inequality follows from F (b) F (r (x)) and r 0 (x) 2 (0; 1).
Proof of Proposition 2 (Existence of Asymmetric Equilibria with Resale)
The proof will use the following lemma.
Proof Recall that ( (1), (2), (11), (14))
Let 0 < a < b. The …rst inequality follows from (a) > a. The second inequality follows from b (b; r (w)) and (w) > w for w 2 [a; b).
Proof of Proposition 2. For all
Notice that (b) is continuously di¤erentiable, strictly decreasing whenever it takes positive values, and that
This last function is also continuously di¤erentiable with g (v s ) = 0. The resale equilibrium conditions are satis…ed (with b as the high cuto¤ and (b) as the low cuto¤) if and only if g (b) 0, with equality if
is increasing in a and is larger than~ L (a; b) for 0 < a < b, it must be that (b ) < a . Consider
The …rst inequality follows from monotonicity of H in its …rst argument, and the second one from H (a; b) <~ H (a; b) for 0 < a < b. Recalling that L (a; b) = F (a)
h dx], we need to show 
Proof
Step 1: If
is weakly increasing in v, then F (r (w)) F (b) r 0 (w) 0 for all w < b, and the inequality is strict if w > 0.
Total di¤erentiation of (7) is weakly increasing in v for all values lower than b, then F (r (w)) F (b) r 0 (w) 0, concluding the proof of this …rst step.
Step 2 where the last equality follows from f (r (x)) @r(x) @b = f (b) r 0 (x) (using the implicit function theorem for (7)). The term F (b) h 1 F (a) l b appears on both sides of this inequality and cancels out. Using equality (19) that we derived for the proof of Lemma 2, the inequality boils down to This inequality holds since all terms in the integrand are positive for all w 2 (a; b) under the hypothesis of the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 3.
We know from the proof of the Propo- 
